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GROSS v. SWITZERLAND: A DEADLY DOSE 
FOR PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
JOHANNA INTERIAN* 
Abstract: On May 14, 2013, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
current assisted suicide law in Switzerland was insufficiently clear. Specifically, 
the failure to address whether a person who was not terminally ill could access 
the necessary drug violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The court would remove impediments 
to obtaining lethal prescriptions by insisting on clearer laws, though it did not go 
far enough by failing to recognize an affirmative right to assisted suicide. Before 
this decision was finalized, however, unexpected events in the case led the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber to render the 2013 decision inad-
missible. Despite this development, the 2013 decision provides insight into how 
the court is likely to analyze the issue of assisted suicide in the future for individ-
uals without a terminal diagnosis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Alda Gross was nearing eighty years old and wanted to die.1 Recogniz-
ing a decline in her physical and mental faculties but wanting to die with dignity, 
Ms. Gross survived a suicide attempt in 2005 and was subsequently placed in a 
psychiatric hospital for six months.2 Her wish to end her life persisted despite 
psychiatric treatment, but the absence of a terminal diagnosis prevented Ms. 
Gross, a Swiss national, from obtaining a prescription that would enable her to 
access physician-assisted suicide.3 In Switzerland, there is no criminal liability 
for administering a lethal drug to a person suffering a terminal illness, but the 
same immunity does not explicitly extend to individuals who are not terminally 
ill.4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Johanna Interian is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Gross v. Switzerland, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 6–7 (2013) (Gross I), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-119703, archived at http://perma.cc/P6RX-
ZK45. 
 2 Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
 3 See id. ¶¶ 1, 11. 
 4 See SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 310, 
arts. 114–15 (Switz.); Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 22, 26, 27; SWISS ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENC-
ES, MEDICAL ETHICS GUIDELINES: END-OF-LIFE CARE 6 (2013), available at http://www.samw.ch/
en/Ethics/Guidelines/Currently-valid-guidelines.html (select “End of Life Care” document), archived 
at https://perma.cc/467T-6BU6?type=pdf [hereinafter SAMS Guidelines]. 
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After unsuccessful attempts at legally obtaining sodium pentobarbital, the 
lethal medication most commonly used in assisted suicides, Ms. Gross filed a 
case with the Swiss courts.5 She alleged that the Swiss government breached 
her right to decide how and when to end her life in violation of Articles 2, 3, 6, 
8, and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (the Convention).6 After several failed appeals, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) heard Ms. Gross’s case, Gross v. Switzerland 
(Gross I), and decided on May 14, 2013 that the absence of clear and compre-
hensive legal guidelines on whether and under which circumstances a non-
terminal individual may end his or her life violated Article 8 of the Conven-
tion.7 Although Ms. Gross’s challenge to Swiss law was successful, the EC-
tHR’s Grand Chamber ultimately rendered the case inadmissible on September 
30, 2014, after it was discovered that Ms. Gross had successfully availed her-
self to an assisted suicide organization in Switzerland in 2011.8 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the facts of Gross I and 
the relevant portions of Swiss criminal law and the Convention. This part also 
presents the procedural history of Ms. Gross’s legal proceedings in Switzerland 
and the ECtHR. Part II discusses the parties’ arguments and the court’s analy-
sis in the 4–3 judgment. This section also examines prior Article 8 case law 
regarding positive obligations on states in providing assisted suicide. Part III 
offers comparisons to the laws on assisted suicide in other European jurisdic-
tions and warns about the practical implications of the 2013 decision. This part 
explains that despite not having legal force, the 2013 decision offers valuable 
insight into how the ECtHR will analyze the issue of assisted suicide for non-
terminal individuals the next time it is encountered. 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 11–14; Saskia Gauthier et al., Suicide Tourism: A Pilot Study on 
the Swiss Phenomenon, J. MED. ETHICS, Aug. 2014, at 1, 1 available at 
http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2014/07/03/medethics-2014-102091.full?sid=0b7d5a7a-276a-408f-
be11-ee7eef9e88d7, archived at http://perma.cc/32AD-4TQ7. 
 6 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 18, 70.  
 7 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 1, 14, 19, 69. Regarding her complaints that Switzerland violated 
Articles 2, 3, 6, and 13, the ECtHR determined that Switzerland was not in violation. Id. ¶¶ 70–71. After 
the final Chamber decision, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber. Press Release, Registrar of the 
Ct., Eur. Ct. H.R., Case Referred to the Grand Chamber 1 (Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release]. 
Determining that the case deserved further examination, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber accepted the refer-
ral on October 7, 2013. Id. For exceptional cases, the Grand Chamber will review cases that raise a seri-
ous question and decide the case by means of a judgment, which becomes final. European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 43, 44, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 8 Gross v. Switzerland, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 17, 30–31 (2014) (Gross II), availa-
ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146780, archived at http://perma.
cc/S5VG-UGX4. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Ms. Gross Decides to Die 
Ms. Gross had been experiencing a decline in her physical and mental 
faculties for years and did not wish to linger in her diminished quality of life.9 
As part of her pursuit to end her life in a manner she considered dignified, Ms. 
Gross obtained a psychiatric examination that stated she was able to form her 
own judgments.10 The evaluation further found that her desire to end her life 
was well-reasoned and was not impulsive or rooted in psychiatric illness.11 
Armed with this medical finding, Ms. Gross sought from various physicians a 
prescription for a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital.12 They all declined to 
prescribe Ms. Gross the drug out of fear that doing so would be deemed a vio-
lation of the code of professional medical conduct or even result in criminal 
prosecution.13 
B. Switzerland and the European Court of Human Rights 
After exhausting her non-legal recourses, Ms. Gross sought a prescription 
for sodium pentobarbital from the Health Board of the Canton of Zurich on 
December 16, 2008.14 Both her request with the Board and her subsequent ap-
peal to the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich were rejected.15 The 
Administrative Court noted that the law in Switzerland regarding assisted sui-
cide was limited to individuals with a terminal illness.16 It thus found that the 
psychiatric examination Ms. Gross relied on for requesting the sodium pento-
barbital was deficient under the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences Medical 
Ethics Guidelines (SAMS Guidelines) on end-of-life care because the psychia-
                                                                                                                           
 9 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 7–9. 
 10 See id. ¶¶ 8, 10. 
 11 See id. ¶ 10; Haas v. Switzerland, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 118 (2011) (holding that if a person 
who seeks assisted suicide is of sound mind, he is required under Swiss case law to obtain a prescrip-
tion for sodium pentobarbital). 
 12 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 8, 11. 
 13 Id. ¶ 11. 
 14 Id. ¶ 12. See generally CANTON OF ZURICH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, http://www.gd.zh.ch/
internet/gesundheitsdirektion/en/home.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/52P4-L8R5 (providing basic information about Zurich’s health department). 
 15 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 13–14. The Zurich Administrative Court is the highest cantonal 
court in the field of administrative law and applies both cantonal law and federal administrative law. 
See generally KANTON ZÜRICH VERWALTUNGSGERICHT: WAS WIR TUN [CANTON OF ZURICH AD-
MINISTRATIVE COURT: WHAT WE DO], http://www.vgr.zh.ch/internet/verwaltungsgericht/de/home.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (Switz.), archived at https://perma.cc/Q5ML-TRCN (describing the 
Administrative Court’s role). 
 16 See Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 14; SAMS Guidelines, supra note 4, at 9. 
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trist did not consider whether Ms. Gross was suffering from an illness that jus-
tified the medical assumption that the end of her life was near.17 
Ms. Gross appealed this decision to the Federal Supreme Court of Swit-
zerland, again requesting the lethal prescription and further asking the court to 
establish that prescribing sodium pentobarbital to a mentally sound person 
deemed capable of making that decision did not violate the medical practition-
er’s professional duties.18 Based on its own case law and on prior ECtHR deci-
sions, the Federal Supreme Court rejected Ms. Gross’s appeal on April 12, 
2010.19 The court held that Ms. Gross’s medically unjustified desire to die did 
not satisfy the SAMS Guidelines and further noted that it was the legislature’s 
role, not the court’s, to decide how to regulate sodium pentobarbital.20 Since 
proceedings in Haas v. Switzerland, another case regarding assisted suicide, 
were then pending before the ECtHR, the Federal Supreme Court concluded it 
was up to that court to determine the correct interpretation of Article 8 in this 
context.21 
The issue in Haas was whether Switzerland had a positive obligation to 
ensure sodium pentobarbital to patients wishing to end their lives.22 In January 
2011, the ECtHR held that deciding when to end one’s life was an aspect of the 
right to respect for private life under Article 8, but states have no affirmative 
state obligation to enable patients seeking assistance in ending their lives.23 
Ms. Gross subsequently appealed her case to the ECtHR, which concluded that 
the law on assisted suicide was insufficiently clear, thus violating Article 8, 
and further found that the Swiss Supreme Court’s reliance on the SAMS medi-
cal ethics guidelines was improper.24 The ECtHR, however, refrained from 
backtracking on the lack of state obligation recently established in Haas.25 
Nevertheless, it recognized the Swiss government’s obligation to provide 
clearer guidance defining the circumstances under which medical practitioners 
can issue the requested prescription in cases where death is not imminent as a 
result of a specific medical condition.26 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 15. 
 18 Id. ¶ 17. The Federal Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in Switzerland and is 
“responsible in particular for protecting the constitutional rights of citizens.” SWISS FED. SUP. CT, 
THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT: THE THIRD POWER WITHIN THE FEDERAL STATE 1, 6 (2014), 
available at http://www.bger.ch/bg_broschuere_a4_e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KRC8-G75P. 
 19 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 19; see Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 197 
(2002) (holding that a husband who wanted to help his terminally ill wife end her life, even though a rare 
illness was causing her physical health to decline quickly was not eligible for immunity). 
 20 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 20–21. 
 21 Id. ¶ 19. 
 22 See Haas v. Switzerland, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 117 (2011). 
 23 Id. at 116. 
 24 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶¶ 38, 65, 67. 
 25 See id. ¶¶ 63, 67. 
 26 Id. ¶ 69. 
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C. The Global Phenomenon of Assisted Suicide 
Gross v. Switzerland highlights the ongoing conflict between bioethics 
and the right to personal autonomy—a polarizing issue many states are cur-
rently struggling to settle.27 Switzerland’s comparatively liberal regulations on 
assisted suicide relative to the other Member States of the Council of Europe 
has sparked a unique phenomenon known as “suicide tourism,” which refers to 
the influx of people traveling to Switzerland with the sole purpose of ending 
their lives there.28 In the United Kingdom, where the second highest proportion 
of suicide tourists comes from, “going to Switzerland” has become a euphe-
mism for assisted suicide.29 A recent study by the Institute of Legal Medicine 
in Zurich found that non-fatal diseases are increasing among suicide tourists, 
who range in age from as young as twenty-three to as old as ninety-seven.30 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Assessment of Article 8 Violations in ECtHR Jurisprudence 
The Gross v. Switzerland decision was not the first time the ECtHR has 
found current state laws dealing with a controversial issue to be insufficiently 
clear.31 In 2010, the ECtHR required Ireland to clarify its statutes regarding 
procedures for legal abortions.32 Ireland’s failure to provide an accessible and 
effective procedure for a woman to establish whether she qualified for a legal 
abortion violated Article 8 of the Convention, which plainly ensures the right 
to respect for private and family life and precludes government intrusion in the 
private realm.33 Through a series of ECtHR decisions, this language has been 
interpreted as including the decision on how and when one’s life should end, 
provided he or she could form a decision in that respect.34 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See id. ¶¶ 34–36, 58; Gauthier et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. The economic realities of not ade-
quately regulating assisted suicides are also troubling, since each case costs the local authorities approx-
imately CHF 3,000 in legal investigations. See Gauthier et al., supra note 5, at 1. 
 28 Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 53; Carol C. Cleary, Comment, From “Personal Autonomy” to 
“Death-on-Demand”: Will Purdy v. DPP Legalize Assisted Suicide in the United Kingdom?, 33 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 290 (2010). 
 29 Gauthier et al., supra note 5, at 1, 3. 
 30 Id. at 3, 5. 
 31 See, e.g., A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 264, 269 (2010) (analyzing the 
positive aspect of Article 8). 
 32 See id. at 270. 
 33 Id.; see Convention, supra note 7, art. 8. 
 34 See, e.g., Haas v. Switzerland, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 116 (2011); Pretty v. United Kingdom, 
2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 195 (2002). 
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Over time, the ECtHR has expanded how fundamental Convention pro-
tections are implicated in close personal relationships.35 In the 2002 case of 
Pretty v. United Kingdom, the State failed to grant criminal immunity to a hus-
band who wished to assist the suicide of his wife, who suffered from an ad-
vanced motor neuron disease that rendered her paralyzed, unable to speak, and 
reliant on a feeding tube.36 The State’s refusal was permissible under Article 8, 
Section 2 of the Convention, as a necessary governmental interference that 
outweighed the individual’s right to access assisted suicide.37 Ten years later in 
Koch v. Germany, the ECtHR unanimously found a violation of the husband’s 
Article 8 right under strikingly similar circumstances.38 Mr. Koch’s late wife 
needed artificial ventilation and constant nurse care after an injury left her al-
most completely paralyzed.39 Considering their twenty-five years of marriage 
and his sustained involvement in the fulfillment of her wish to end her life, the 
court held that Germany had interfered with Mr. Koch’s own right to respect 
for his private life.40 The ECtHR, however, did not go as far as recognizing a 
violation of Article 8 on behalf of his late wife because of a lack of standing.41 
For as much as Article 8 has been broadly construed, the ECtHR has 
stepped back and allowed States more discretion in areas where Member States 
have not reached a consensus.42 In Haas v. Switzerland, the ECtHR established 
that determining how and when to end one’s life was an aspect of Article 8’s 
fundamental right to personal autonomy, but found no affirmative right to gov-
ernmental assistance to that end.43 The ECtHR further considered that requir-
ing a prescription for sodium pentobarbital did not violate Article 8, because it 
was essential to protecting the health and safety of vulnerable people.44 This 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Koch v. Germany, App. No. 497/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 50, 54 (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-112282, archived at http://perma.cc/7W9X-
XAYJ. 
 36 Pretty, 2002-III at 162–63. 
 37 Id. at 196–97. Article 8, Section 2 of the Convention states, 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the in-
terests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Convention, supra note 7, art. 8 ¶ 2. 
 38 See Koch, App. No. 497/09, ¶¶ 8, 50, 54. 
 39 Id. ¶ 8. 
 40 Id. ¶¶ 45, 54. Mr. Koch filed joint appeals with his wife and even attempted to pursue claims 
related to her case after her death. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15, 45, 47, 50. He accompanied his wife on the ten-hour 
trip to Zurich, where she ended her life with the help of an assisted suicide organization. Id. ¶ 12. 
 41 Id. ¶¶ 68, 81. 
 42 See id. ¶ 70. 
 43 Haas v. Switzerland, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 116, 118 (2011). 
 44 See id. at 117, 118. 
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particular case concerned an individual who had been suffering from a serious 
case of bipolar affective disorder for about twenty years and had twice at-
tempted suicide.45 Mr. Haas argued that by requiring a thorough psychiatric 
assessment and doctor’s prescription to obtain the lethal substance, Switzer-
land failed to respect his right to end his life in a safe and dignified manner.46 
Of the 170 psychiatrists Mr. Haas contacted for the requisite preliminary psy-
chiatric examination, none agreed to even evaluate him, effectively barring 
him from obtaining a prescription for sodium pentobarbital in Switzerland.47 
Part of the court’s reasoning was the purported lack of consensus among 
Member States regarding the right of an individual to choose how and when to 
end his life.48  In deference to states’ generally wide margin of discretion in 
largely undecided matters, the ECtHR found no positive obligation to ensure a 
right to assisted suicide.49 
B. The Parties’ Arguments 
Ms. Gross relied on a combination of Convention Articles for her claim.50 
She alleged that denying her the right to decide by what means and at what 
point her life would end, Switzerland had violated Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, and 13 of 
the Convention.51 She argued that Switzerland had an obligation to provide the 
necessary means allowing her to effectively and concretely exercise her right 
to end her life.52 Regarding the SAMS Guidelines on end-of-life care, Ms. 
Gross pointed out that they do not have the formal quality of law and had not 
been adopted through a democratic process.53 Moreover, the medical ethics 
guidelines were not applicable to her situation because they presupposed that 
the end of a patient’s life was near, which was not the case with Ms. Gross.54 
The Swiss government argued that the Convention had to be taken as a 
whole and cited to the ECtHR rulings in Pretty and Haas for the proposition 
that states have no positive obligation to allow assisted suicide.55 It further ar-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. at 102. 
 46 See id. at 102–03. 
 47 Id. 107–08. 
 48 See id. at 117–18. 
 49 Compare Haas, 2011-I at 118–19 (rejecting positive obligation on the part of the state due to lack 
of consensus among Member States), with A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 243, 
272–73 (2010) (holding the prohibition on abortion in Ireland to be in stark contrast to the consensus 
among contracting states). Among the Swiss cantons, attempts at regulation failed in 2009, because there 
was no consensus on how to regulate assisted suicide with respect to the physician’s duty of care. Gross 
v. Switzerland, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 29 (2013) (Gross I). 
 50 Id. ¶ 18. 
 51 See id. ¶¶ 18, 70. 
 52 Id. ¶ 18. 
 53 Id. ¶ 45. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. ¶¶ 46, 50. 
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gued that the risks of abuse justified its decision to restrict access to the fatal 
medication.56 Article 8, Section 2, enabled Switzerland to regulate, as neces-
sary, activities that were detrimental to the life and safety of the Swiss peo-
ple.57 Moreover, the state was under an obligation, under Article 2, to protect 
people who may be mentally unstable from access to a substance that would 
facilitate their suicide.58 Viewed in that light, the requirements of a psychiatric 
examination and medical prescription were reasonable “safeguards against the 
risk of the floodgates being opened, particularly given that the consequences 
would be fatal for those concerned.”59 
C. Court Calls for Legal Certainty 
The ECtHR did not fully embrace either party’s arguments.60 On May 14, 
2013, it held that although the state does not have an affirmative obligation to 
permit assisted suicide, it did have the obligation to be clear about its position 
on assisted suicide.61 The failure of Switzerland to clarify its position on who 
could access assisted suicide would have a “chilling effect on doctors who 
would otherwise be inclined to provide someone such as the applicant with the 
requested medical prescription.”62 The ECtHR agreed with Ms. Gross that the 
SAMS Guidelines were inapplicable in her case for not having the formal 
quality of law and because she did not meet the criteria set out.63 Uncertainty 
regarding the extent of her right to end her life placed Ms. Gross and others 
like her “in a state of anguish . . . which would not have occurred if there had 
been clear, State-approved guidelines [in cases] where death is not imminent as 
a result of a specific medical condition.”64 The court thus called for state inter-
vention where there would otherwise be lack of clarity that could injure the 
fundamental rights of citizens.65 
D. Deathbed Wish Unfulfilled: Case Rendered Inadmissible  
After Ms. Gross’s Suicide 
While the case was pending before the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber, the 
Swiss government discovered that Ms. Gross had killed herself with the assis-
tance of the right-to-die association, EXIT, in November 2011, more than a 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. ¶ 52. 
 57 Id. ¶¶ 46–47. 
 58 Id. ¶ 50. 
 59 Id. ¶ 53. 
 60 Id. ¶ 69. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. ¶ 65. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. ¶ 66. 
 65 See id. 
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year before the May 2013 decision was issued.66 The Swiss government alert-
ed the ECtHR of this development on January 7, 2014 and urged the ECtHR to 
declare Ms. Gross’s application inadmissible.67 Like the defendant government 
and the ECtHR, Ms. Gross’s counsel was unaware of her death.68 Since Janu-
ary 2010, Ms. Gross had been communicating with her counsel through a third 
party—a retired pastor protected by confidentiality—because the proceedings 
had become too stressful for her.69 On September 30, 2014, the Grand Cham-
ber issued a 9–8 decision holding that Ms. Gross had abused her right of indi-
vidual application under Article 35 of the Convention, thereby rendering her 
application inadmissible.70 
III. ANALYSIS 
The opinions of both the 2013 and the 2014 ECtHR judgments in Gross I 
and Gross II, in which the judges were split 4–3 and 9–8 respectively, are 
symbolic of the far from settled nature of assisted suicide.71 Despite the moral-
ly charged nature of the debate, rendering the case inadmissible was inappro-
priate because the proceedings did not waste the court’s efforts.72 The number 
of assisted suicides, and especially of individuals traveling to Switzerland for 
this purpose, remains staggeringly high.73 With the number of assisted suicides 
unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future, “[T]he issue of assisted suicide is 
likely to engender future applications to the [ECtHR] and thus certainly merits 
examination.”74 Although Ms. Gross’s suicide has invalidated the original 
judgment, the 2013 decision on the merits lives on through its insight on how 
the ECtHR would examine this morally charged issue the next time it is en-
countered.75 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Gross v. Switzerland, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1,17, 30–31 (2014) (Gross II). EXIT is 
the largest right-to-die organization in Switzerland, with nearly 80,000 members. See Gauthier et al., 
supra note 5, at 2. 
 67 Gross II, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 19. 
 68 Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 22. 
 69 Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 32. 
 70 Id. ¶ 37. 
 71 See id.; Gross v. Switzerland, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 76 (2013) (Gross I). The 
2013 Chamber ruled in favor of the petitioner four to three, while the final 2014 Grand Chamber ruled in 
favor of the state nine to eight. Gross II, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 37; Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 76. 
 72 See Gross II, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 1, 8 (Spielmann, J., Ziemele, J., Berro-Lefèvre, J., Zupančič, 
J., Hajiyev, J., Tsotsoria, J., Sicilianos, J., Keller, J., dissenting). 
 73 See Gauthier et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 74 See Gross II, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 1, 8 (Spielmann, J., Ziemele, J., Berro-Lefèvre, J., Zupančič, 
J., Hajiyev, J., Tsotsoria, J., Sicilianos, J., Keller, J., dissenting). 
 75 See Gauthier et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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A. Court as Catalyst for Controversial Question 
The 2013 Gross I decision exemplifies how non-state involvement—in 
this case, the ECtHR—can encourage a state legislature to clarify legal issues 
that carry potentially devastating effects without undermining state sovereign-
ty.76 Rather than relying on the slow and cumbersome legislative process to 
take the first step, the ECtHR’s ruling hastens governmental action by applying 
pressure on the Swiss legislature to be clear about what the law is and who can 
avail themselves of it.77 Remaining neutral as to how assisted suicide should 
be dealt with, the court merely called for the legislature to clarify the position 
it wishes to adopt.78 This deference ensures that the court does not interfere 
with the realm of state sovereignty in addressing assisted suicide as a human 
rights issue.79 Moreover, the fact that the ECtHR patently considers consensus 
among Member States in evaluating Convention violations shows how the de-
bate around assisted suicide is being shaped by the diverging mores of the nu-
merous states.80 Although the court remained silent on how the Swiss govern-
ment should shape its policy, the case is noteworthy by virtue of the fact that 
the ECtHR required government action to address specific issues related to 
when and how to permit assisted suicide within its borders.81 
B. Benelux Laws on Assisted Suicide 
Of the forty-seven Member States, only the Netherlands, Belgium, Lux-
embourg and Switzerland openly allow assisted suicide.82 Luxembourg, which 
decriminalized assisted suicide in 2009, has largely the same requirements as 
Switzerland, with the distinction that Luxembourg specifies that the requester 
must be “in a hopeless medical situation . . . without prospect of improvement, 
resulting from an accidental or pathological condition.”83 This specificity is in 
stark contrast to Switzerland’s criminal codes since it leaves little doubt that a 
patient with a desire to die unrelated to a medical diagnosis or injury is not 
entitled to assisted suicide.84 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, ¶ 66. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. ¶ 69. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. ¶¶ 34–36, 59. 
 81 Id. ¶¶ 61–62, 66, 69. 
 82 See id. ¶¶ 35–36. 
 83 Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l’euthanasie et l’assistance au suicide / Legislation Reglementant les 
Soins Palliatifs ainsi que L’Euthanasie et L’Assistance au Suicide [Legislation Regulating Palliative 
Care, Euthanasia, and Assisted Suicide] ch. 2, art. 2(3), J. OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUX. [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], Mar. 16, 2009, No. 46, 609, 615 (Lux.) (translated by au-
thor). 
 84 See id.; SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 
310, arts. 114–115 (Switz.); Gross I, App. No. 67810/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 66, 69. 
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In the Netherlands, which decriminalized assisted suicide in 2002, the 
emphasis is on the physician’s conduct and the medical assessment of the pa-
tient’s situation.85 The patient must believe there is no other reasonable solu-
tion, while the doctor must believe the request is voluntary and well-
considered and that the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable.86 More-
over, the doctor must inform the patient of his or her prospects and must con-
sult another independent physician for their opinion.87 Finally, the Netherlands 
imposes a requirement of due care for how the life is terminated.88 
The Belgian Euthanasia Act was enacted on September 23, 2002.89 Like 
the Netherlands, Belgium places the onus on the physician, but goes further 
than the Dutch law by including more specific requirements as to the steps that 
must be taken before deciding to assist the patient’s suicide.90 For example, the 
Belgian law specifies that the physician must have had “several conversations 
with the patient spread out over a reasonable period of time, taking into ac-
count the progress of the patient’s condition.”91 In addition to seeking a second 
opinion with an independent physician, the physician must also discuss the 
patient’s request with “a nursing team that has regular contact with the pa-
tient,” if applicable.92 
These rigorous requirements in the Netherlands and Belgium are prob-
lematic in practice because they may cause physicians to opt out of providing 
assisted suicide rather than running the risk of violating the law by failing to 
painstakingly document each required step.93 The practical effect of Gross I is 
that states that choose to allow assisted suicide in some capacity have a greater 
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legislative burden to make their law well-defined, but the more rigid a law is, 
the less accessible it may be to the citizens who need it.94 If it is easier for a 
government that is considering a provision on assisted suicide to simply leave 
it out, it may choose to omit it entirely rather than risk the consequences of not 
being clear or having their intent misinterpreted.95 A version of this type of 
inaction occurred in Switzerland in 2009 when lack of consensus among the 
cantons, political parties, and other interested parties resulted in complete 
omissions of specific criminal regulations on duties of care in assisted sui-
cide.96 This occurred in spite of agreement among the consulted parties that the 
federal law should specifically provide for organized assisted suicide.97 Thus, 
by refraining from recognizing an affirmative right to assisted suicide, the EC-
tHR renders the Article 8 entitlement to personal autonomy illusory.98 
C. Practical Implications of Gross Decisions 
Notwithstanding the positive precedent Gross I may set as a catalyst for 
legislative action, the decision fails to remove functional obstacles to the insti-
tution of assisted suicide.99 Furthermore, the court renders the Article 8 enti-
tlement to personal autonomy illusory by acknowledging the fundamental right 
to decide when to die, without recognizing a corresponding affirmative obliga-
tion on the state to allow assisted suicide.100 
Even if the Swiss government explicitly decriminalizes assisted suicide 
for individuals who are not suffering from a terminal illness, the SAMS Guide-
lines and controlled substance laws could continue preventing physicians from 
confidently prescribing the medication necessary for the lawful suicides.101 If 
the code of medical ethics continues to be vague regarding patients without a 
terminal diagnosis, a physician could potentially face professional repercus-
sions by providing assistance in those cases.102 Though the SAMS Guidelines 
are not legally binding, they govern a profession that impacts each individual 
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in Switzerland.103 An overwhelming 92.2 percent of physicians stated in a re-
cent survey that the SAMS Guidelines serve as orientation and aid for their 
decision-making.104 As the code of conduct generally accepted by Swiss medi-
cal practitioners, the SAMS Guidelines constitute “[t]he recognized rules of 
pharmaceutical and medical sciences [that] must be respected when prescrib-
ing and dispensing medicinal products.”105 Thus, until the medical ethics 
guidelines are revised, physician hesitation or outright refusal, precisely of the 
kind that Ms. Gross was met with when she sought prescriptions for sodium 
pentobarbital, could impede lawful assisted suicides.106 
The decision in Gross I highlights the need to reform not just medical eth-
ics guidelines, but also the laws governing controlled substances.107 In Swit-
zerland, the International Convention on Psychotropic Substances, together 
with the Federal Law on Medical Products and Medical Devices and the Fed-
eral Law on Drugs present impediments to patients who seek to end their lives 
in a dignified way.108 These conventions state generally the legal ramifications 
for medical professionals who administer controlled substances, but are silent 
on the appropriate dissemination of serious medications like sodium pentobar-
bital.109 In the absence of legislative guidance, case law has established that a 
prescription is required for sodium pentobarbital and has outlined the means 
for its regulation.110 The fact that sodium pentobarbital is effectively regulated 
by the courts rather than by legislative mandates is unacceptable.111 As the sole 
medication used in assisted suicides, the legislature needs to codify how, when, 
and under what circumstances the lethal substance is regulated.112 
As the ECtHR insightfully acknowledged, the increased life expectancies 
owed to “growing medical sophistication” have not yet been coupled with a 
corresponding increase in quality of life.113 This may explain why illnesses that 
are not fatal, such as neurological and rheumatic diseases, are increasingly be-
ing cited by patients as the underlying conditions for seeking assisted sui-
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cide.114 The court poignantly recognized that “many people are concerned that 
they should not be forced to linger in old age or in states of advanced physical 
or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and per-
sonal identity[.]”115 This statement endorses the prevailing view from a 2012 
study in which 76.9 percent of Europeans surveyed believed that every person 
should determine when and how he or she will die.116 The ECtHR’s May 2013 
judgment was positive in that the ECtHR encouraged statutory changes with-
out violating state autonomy, but the judgment did not go far enough by refus-
ing to acknowledge that an individual’s right to decide how and when to die 
necessitates a corresponding obligation on the state to ensure access to the le-
thal drug.117 
CONCLUSION 
The four-to-three decision of May 2013 in Gross v. Switzerland reiterates 
the far from settled nature of the debate over assisted suicide. The ECtHR pulls 
in both directions by acknowledging the dichotomy between medical advances 
prolonging life without simultaneously increasing quality of life in later years. 
Nevertheless, the court is hesitant to weigh in on the intent of the Swiss legis-
lature or to impose a positive obligation on the state to allow Ms. Gross to ef-
fectively exercise her right to personal autonomy. Requiring Member States to 
clarify their position on assisted suicide is likely to promote better-drafted as-
sisted suicide laws, but may also halt progress if compromises on technical 
issues cannot be reached or legislators decide regulating assisted suicide is not 
worth the political risk. Further, by not imposing a positive state obligation, the 
ECtHR frustrates the purpose of Article 8 and renders meaningless the estab-
lished right to decide how and when to end one’s life. The ECtHR boldly diag-
noses the ongoing conflict between bioethics and the right to personal autono-
my, but the court’s approach in Gross is not the cure. 
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